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I
t is a great pleasure to attend this conference
on monetary policy and learning and enjoy the
many excellent papers presented here. I am
very grateful for the opportunity to speak to
this distinguished audience of researchers and
policymakers, and I hope my remarks will
stimulate some further discussion. I will talk about
three things, namely, (1) good monetary policy and
central-bank learning, (2) private-sector learning and
central-bank transparency, and (3) modeling good
monetary policy.
Good Monetary Policy and 
Central-Bank Learning
I
n talking about good monetary policy and central-
bank learning, I will start by characterizing good
monetary policy. Travestying Tolstoy, one could say:
“Every good monetary policy is (approximately) the
same, but bad monetary policies are all different.”
Indeed, I believe there is increasing agreement on a
best-international-practice way of conducting mon-
etary policy. Let me try to briefly outline this.
There is a clear objective for monetary policy.
This objective can be described as “stabilizing infla-
tion around a low inflation target with some con-
cern for stabilizing output around potential output”
or some variant of this. This objective is consistent
with what is often called flexible inflation targeting.
To achieve this objective, the central bank relies on
its view of the transmission mechanism of monetary
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policy—the transmission mechanism that, through
several channels, links the central bank’s instrument
(usually a short interest rate, the instrument rate)
and the target variables (inflation and the output gap
in the above formulation of the objective for monetary
policy). There is now considerable agreement among
central banks on this transmission mechanism. Let
me give a very stylized picture of this conventional
wisdom about the transmission mechanism.
The central bank controls the instrument rate, a
short interest rate. Because inflation and inflation
expectations are sticky, the central bank has some
control over the short real interest rate. Private-
sector expectations of future short real rates affect
longer real interest rates as well as other asset
prices—for instance, exchange rates. Long real inter-
est rates and various asset prices have an effect on
consumption and investment and thereby affect
aggregate demand.
Furthermore, private-sector inflation expecta-
tions and the output gap—the latter through its
impact on production costs—affect firms’ price set-
ting and thereby inflation. Thus, central banks have
some control over the output gap and inflation.
However, this control is very imperfect: varying lags
are present in the transmission mechanism, the
strength of different channels varies, and interven-
ing shocks occur. The mean control lag may be three
to five quarters for the output gap and perhaps five
to nine quarters for inflation.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
the inflation target and the output-gap projection
approaches zero (the output projection approaches
the potential-output projection), both at an appro-
priate pace. The resulting inflation and output-gap
projections can be seen as minimizing an intertem-
poral loss function over the set of feasible inflation
and output-gap projections, conditional on avail-
able information.
I have previously called this procedure of finding
the optimal projections forecast targeting. It can
be seen as an operational way of solving a complex
optimal-control problem. However, this problem is
not solved by deriving an explicit reaction function
for the instrument. Such a function would be an
exceedingly complex function of all the inputs in
the forecasting process, including the central bank’s
judgment. Fortunately, there is no need to specify
this reaction function; it can remain implicit.
Instead, the procedure described above results in
an instrument-rate path that can be implemented as
is, until the next decision point when the forecast-
targeting procedure is repeated.
Suppose that the central bank’s view of the
transmission mechanism corresponds to linear rela-
tions between the different variables, that its objec-
tives can be interpreted as a quadratic loss function,
and that all uncertainty enters in an additive way.
Then the conditions for certainty equivalence are
fulfilled. In that case, only the first moments—the
means—matter for the policy, and all projections
can be interpreted as mean forecasts. The proce-
dure can then be called mean forecast targeting.
Suppose instead that the central bank’s view of
the transmission mechanism corresponds to nonlin-
ear relations between the different variables, that
its objectives are different from a quadratic loss
function, or that uncertainty enters in a nonadditive
way. Then the conditions for certainty equivalence
are not fulfilled. In that case, more than the first
moments matter. Indeed, in the general case, the
whole probability distribution of future realizations
of the target variables matters. Then the decision
problem is to find the instrument path for which the
probability distributions of the future target vari-
ables “look good” and are consistent with the objec-
tives. The Bank of England and Sweden’s Riksbank
illustrate the probability distribution of forecasts
with the help of so-called fan charts. Given a loss
function, the intertemporal loss can still be calcu-
lated with numerical methods if visual inspection is
not considered sufficient. This procedure can be
called distribution forecast targeting.
I have already emphasized that private-sector
expectations are crucial in the transmission mech-
In this transmission mechanism, private-sector
expectations are crucial. I think it is fair to say that
central banks control the output gap and inflation
mostly through the private-sector expectations
they give rise to. (For this reason, central bankers’
obsession with “credibility” is completely rational.)
For instance, the current instrument rate by itself
has a minimal effect on longer interest rates and the
economy; what really matters is the private-sector
expectations of future instrument rates. Further-
more, inflation expectations have a major impact on
actual inflation.
Let me also note that, counter to what is the
case in the simple Lucas-type Phillips curve, mon-
etary policy does not have real effects because it
brings surprises. In this conventional view of the
transmission mechanism, because inflation and
inflation expectations are sticky, anticipated policy
actions have real effects. Indeed, the more cor-
rectly anticipated the policy action, the larger the
effects may be.
How does a good central bank conduct good
monetary policy? It first constructs conditional
forecasts—projections—of the target variables.
These projections are conditional on the central
bank’s view of the transmission mechanism and
various models used, available and relevant infor-
mation about the state of the economy, forecasts
of exogenous variables, alternative instrument-
rate paths, and, importantly, the central bank’s
“judgment.” All models are simple representations
of a complex reality. A good central bank needs to
supplement the use of models with its own judg-
ment, which includes extra-model modifications,
add factors, and so on.
The central bank’s decision problem is to select
an instrument-rate path and corresponding infla-
tion and output-gap projections that “look good”
and then implement that instrument-rate path.
By “looking good,” I mean that the inflation and
output-gap projections are consistent with the objec-
tives. That is, the inflation projection approaches
Central banks accumulate experience and learn
from successes and mistakes. Having observed
this process of learning in several good central
banks, I find it a very efficient and rational
process and, indeed, a very impressive one.13 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
anism for monetary policy. Indeed, good central
banks take account of private-sector expectations
and treat them very much as independent state
variables that they monitor and respond to. Good
central banks devote considerable resources to
monitoring and extracting private-sector expecta-
tions from a number of sources, including exten-
sive surveys, term structure data, options prices,
and other asset prices. The extracted or estimated
private-sector expectations are then used as one
set of inputs in the forecasting process. Using
private-sector expectations as inputs in the fore-
casting process indeed implies that the central
bank in the end will respond in the appropriate
way to these expectations.
Indeed, the forecast targeting described above
ensures the appropriate instrument-rate response
to all incoming information. As I have expressed it
before, the incoming information is, in effect, “fil-
tered through the forecasts.” Only if an incoming
piece of information shifts the inflation or output-
gap projections will an adjustment of the instrument-
rate path be motivated. In practice, most of the
incoming information will not have any effect on the
projections and will therefore not be responded to.
Actually, filtering through the forecasts provides a
safeguard against overreacting and responding too
much to incoming information.
I believe this monitoring and response to private-
sector expectations is an important aspect of fore-
cast targeting and something that the literature on
central-bank learning should take into account.
At this conference, the Orphanides and Williams
(2003) paper stands out in explicitly taking this
into account.
The learning inside the central bank takes on a
number of different forms: continuous research on
the economy and the transmission mechanism and
corresponding model development, exchange of
research and information with other central banks
and academic researchers (for instance, at confer-
ences such as this one), estimation and reestimation
of a number of different models, and refinement
of techniques and the decision framework. Central
banks also accumulate experience and learn from
successes and mistakes. Having observed this
process of learning in several good central banks, I
find it a very efficient and rational process and,
indeed, a very impressive one.
Private-Sector Learning and 
Central-Bank Transparency
N
ext, let me talk about private-sector learning
(including learning by policy authorities other
than central banks) and central-bank transparency.
Private-sector learning involves learning about the
economy and about policy. It involves forming
expectations and predicting the economic environ-
ment for the purpose of making the most informed
decisions. This private-sector learning is the subject
of several excellent papers at this conference.
Nevertheless, I believe an important aspect of
private-sector learning is missing in the papers 
presented here—namely, the role of central-bank
transparency. I am convinced that central-bank trans-
parency can have an important impact on private-
sector learning and, for instance, facilitate private-
sector learning and speed up its convergence.
Transparency about the objectives of monetary
policy is an important part of central-bank trans-
parency. It involves announcing the inflation target
applied and indicating the relative weight on other
objectives, for instance, output-gap stabilization.
Indeed, in Svensson (2003a), I have argued that the
time has come for central banks to announce also
the relative weight on output gap stabilization and
suggested procedures for how monetary policy com-
mittees can decide on this weight. Without these
announcements, the private sector has to spend time
and resources on learning the objectives of mone-
tary policy. Indeed, another paper by Orphanides and
Williams (forthcoming) demonstrates that private-
sector learning about the inflation process is more
effective if the private sector knows the inflation tar-
get. The paper provides a precise example of how
an explicit inflation target can provide a better
anchor for inflation expectations. As a consequence,
the trade-off between inflation and output-gap sta-
bility becomes more favorable. Faust and Svensson
(2001) show that increased transparency allows the
private sector to better discover any central-bank
deviation from announced goals. This greater likeli-
hood of discovery increases the cost for the central
bank of any deviations and thereby induces the
bank to stick to its announced objectives; trans-
parency then works as a commitment mechanism.
Increased central-bank transparency about
the state of the economy, the working of the
economy, and monetary policy should provide
useful information to the private sector and
induce better private-sector decisions and
thus improve welfare.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
that instrument rule is treated as a structural rela-
tion. As I have argued in several papers, most
recently in Svensson (2003b), this practice is very
problematic, and there are better ways of modeling
good monetary policy.
Let me remind you of the state of macroeconom-
ics before the mid-1970s. Then, private-sector
behavior was often modeled in a rather mechanical
way, with ad hoc consumption functions for house-
holds and investment functions for firms. The Lucas
critique emphasized that such behavioral functions
were reduced forms and endogenous rather than
structural and that they would not be invariant to
changes in the economic environment, for instance,
the policy regime.
These days, it is standard instead to model
households and firms with microfoundations in the
form of optimizing behavior. Households’ and firms’
intertemporal optimization results in first-order
conditions (Euler conditions) for consumption and
investment, which form the basis for a structural
aggregate-demand relation between aggregate
demand and the real interest rate. Firms’ optimal
price-setting causes a first-order condition that
results in a structural aggregate-supply relation
between inflation, inflation expectations, and the
output gap—a Phillips curve.
However, there is often a conspicuous asymmetry
in many papers in that central-bank behavior is still
often modeled in a mechanical way, as following an
ad hoc instrument rule, such as a Taylor rule. This
instrument rule is implicitly treated as structural.
But the good monetary policy described above does
not result in a Taylor rule. Instead, it implies a more
complex reduced-form reaction function in which
the instrument rate is a function of all the inputs
in the forecasting process. Furthermore, no central
bank (that I am aware of) uses a Taylor rule as the
main guide to its instrument-rate setting or has com-
mitted itself to a similar instrument rule. (Then the
central bank staff could be reduced to a clerk armed
with a formula and a hand-calculator, as McCallum
has expressed it.) 
I believe that it is better to model monetary pol-
icy as optimizing in the same way we model the
private sector. Such modeling specifies the objec-
tives and constraints of monetary policy, derives
first-order conditions (Euler conditions), and
models monetary policy with the help of those
first-order conditions, what I have called optimal
targeting rules. This approach restores the sym-
metry in the modeling of private-sector and central-
bank behavior. Indeed, I believe good central banks
are at least as goal-directed, rational, and optimiz-
Transparency in the form of publication of infla-
tion projections, the output gap, and interest rates,
including assumptions and analysis, is likely to have
a direct impact on inflation expectations. This
impact makes the implementation of monetary pol-
icy more effective. Indeed, I emphasized earlier that
the expectations of the future instrument rate is
more important than the current instrument rate.
What better way of affecting the term structure of
interest rates than publishing a well-motivated
instrument-rate path?
Transparency about the central bank’s view of
the economy and the transmission mechanism can
also speed up private-sector learning. Good central
banks actually educate the general public about the
economy and how monetary policy works. As an
example, I can mention that the Riksbank has had
some success in teaching powerful Swedish trade
unions that the long-term Phillips curve is vertical.
More generally, increased central-bank trans-
parency about the state of the economy, the work-
ing of the economy, and monetary policy should
provide lots of useful information to the private sec-
tor and induce better private-sector decisions and
thus improve welfare. Indeed, there are hundreds of
Federal Reserve economists who thoroughly moni-
tor and analyze the U.S. economy. Why should their
information be kept secret from the general public? 
On a more technical note, in situations with mul-
tiple equilibria, Svensson and Woodford (forthcom-
ing) argue that published central-bank forecasts
can potentially provide a focal point for private-




inally, let me get to the issue of how to model
monetary policy. Many papers, including several
at this conference, model monetary policy in a
mechanical and ad hoc way as a given reaction func-
tion—an instrument rule, for instance, a Taylor
rule or a given money-supply process. In particular,
There is often a conspicuous asymmetry in
many papers in that central-bank behavior is
still often modeled in a mechanical way, as
following an ad hoc instrument rule, such as
a Taylor rule.15 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
ing as the average household or firm. (For one
thing, good central banks employ far more sharp
Ph.D.s to assist them in their policymaking.)
Recently, several papers—for instance, Svensson
and Woodford (forthcoming) and a series of
papers by Giannoni and Woodford, including
(forthcoming)—have taken this approach to mod-
eling monetary policy.
Regarding the learning literature, Orphanides
and Williams (2003) and Sargent and Williams (2003)
at this conference examine learning under the
assumption of optimizing behavior. In other papers
than those presented in this conference, Evans
and Honkapohja (2003) and Preston (2002) have
recently examined learning under the same assump-
tion of optimizing behavior.
This criticism of modeling monetary policy with
ad hoc reaction functions should in no way be
understood as an attempt to reduce the importance
of Taylor’s (1993) classic paper. Indeed, we can com-
pare it with another classic paper, Friedman’s 1967
presidential address (1968). This is indeed a classic
paper in the field of monetary policy, with deep
insights, warning about the danger of an overambi-
tious monetary policy with insufficient knowledge
about the transmission mechanism of monetary pol-
icy and suggesting money growth targeting, k%, as a
safer way of conducting good monetary policy rather
than directly targeting inflation or the price level
(even if the latter, everything else being equal,
would be more desirable). This paper, a great con-
tribution at the time, is one that we can still admire.
But few sensible people would advocate or model
monetary policy as k% today. The reason is that cen-
tral banks can do better, and are doing better, than
k% today. The understanding of the transmission
mechanism is better today, and during the last
decade a number of central banks have demon-
strated  that they can successfully target inflation
directly, counter to what Friedman thought possible
at the time of his presidential address. Instead, I
believe we should think of k% as something we
could fall back on in case of an emergency, when the
transmission mechanism drastically changes or
some unanticipated event reduces the power to
target inflation directly.
Similarly, Taylor’s (1993) classic paper is also full
of important insights. The Taylor rule is a very
interesting and very simple benchmark for mone-
tary policy. The Taylor principle—that inflation-
stabilizing monetary policy should imply a larger
than one-to-one interest rate response to a persis-
tent increase in inflation—is an important insight.
Taylor’s contribution was a great advance at the
time, and we should still admire his paper. But this
admiration does not mean that we should advocate
the Taylor rule as good monetary policy now or
model good monetary policy as following a Taylor
rule. Indeed, central banks can do, and are doing,
better than the Taylor rule today. Good central
banks use and implicitly respond to much more
information than the Taylor rule, as does optimal
policy. As explained above, all information that
affects the inflation and output-gap projections is
implicitly responded to. Again, as for k%, we should
think of the Taylor rule as something that we could
fall back on in emergencies. (And if that wouldn’t
work and stabilize the economy, we could fall back
further to k%.) But normally, good central banks
can do better than the Taylor rule, and we should
model good monetary policy accordingly.
Conclusion
S
o let me finish here. I have talked about three
things. First, I talked about good monetary
policy and central-bank learning, emphasizing the
role of private-sector expectations as indepen-
dent variables to be monitored, used as inputs in
forecasts, and (implicitly) responded to. Second, I
talked about private-sector learning and central-
bank transparency, emphasizing that central-bank
transparency can improve private-sector learning
(and have many other good consequences, too)
and should be taken into account in the work on
learning. Finally, I talked about modeling good
monetary policy and emphasized that good mone-
tary policy should not be modeled with ad hoc
reaction functions that are not structural but
instead as optimizing policy, with the help of opti-
mal targeting rules.
Again, let me thank the organizers very much for
the opportunity to speak here. 
Good monetary policy should not be modeled
with ad hoc reaction functions that are not
structural but instead as optimizing policy,
with the help of optimal targeting rules.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
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